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DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO WEIGHTED VOTING
SYSTEMS BASED ON PREFERENTIAL POSITIONS
Robert Bystrický
Voting systems produce an aggregated result of the individual preferences of the voters. In
many cases the aggregated collective preference – the result of the voting procedure – mirrors
much more than anything else the characteristics of the voting systems. Preferential voting
systems work most of the time with equidistant differences between the adjacent preferences
of an individual voter. They produce, as voting systems usually do, some paradoxical results
under special circumstances. However, the distances between the preferences can be understood
as the function of the position in the sequence of preferences and can be aggregated in different
ways fulfilling the basic attributes of the voting system. This approach at least allows us to
avoid the worst paradoxical situations or to design a voting system containing some special
needs.
Keywords: voting system, preference, position
Classification: 90A28, 90A05, 90A08, 62F07
1. INTRODUCTION
We can understand voting as a method for a group (electorate, meeting, part of soci-
ety, country) to transfer and combine their will, preferences or motions of individuals
represented by the vote. Alternatively, in other words voting and elections are a decision-
making process, which aggregates individual preferences to give a social choice or elec-
tion outcome that reflects the interests or “desires” of the electorate [2]. Elections, as
it is largely known, produce many different results according to the voting system used,
counting, and tabulations of results. We are aware of many different voting systems and
different approaches to them. In many cases the aggregated collective preference – the
result of the voting procedure mirrors much more than anything else the characteristics
of the voting system. There is a need to have the possibility to influence the selected
voting system in a desired direction. This need requires a tool to design and adapt
known voting systems and schemes and at the same time to understand the influence of
the changes.
In this paper, we will discuss only the situation when the voter is able to provide the
ordinal preferential sequence of alternatives or candidates chosen. Preferential voting
systems work most of the time with equidistant differences between the adjacent pref-
erences of the individual voter. These voting systems also produce, as voting systems
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usually do, some paradoxical results under special circumstances. However, the prefer-
ential position in the sequence of preferences can be awarded with specific weights for
respective positions. These weighted values can be aggregated in different ways fulfilling
the basic attributes of the voting system. The described approach could at least allow
us to avoid the worst paradoxical situations or to design a voting systems containing
some special needs. Another possible application of this approach or reason for using it
can be the modification of an existing voting system by just introducing this weighted
method into them, in order to secure some specified characteristics of the voting system
and it can be a quite simple way how to achieve it. We will discuss the influence of the
introduced approach to the classic voting system with a single winner – it means the
selection of the “most preferred” alternative from a range of alternatives. The original
motivation to start our game with the weights allocated to the preferences is the per-
ception that the differences in the value between e. g. 1st and 2nd preferences doesn’t
have to be the same as between e. g. the 3rd and 4th positions. It came from the belief
that the differences between adjacent preferences could be understood as the distances
between them and so they do not have to be the same (equidistant case) as they usually
are in common systems.
The reason to study different approaches to the voting systems is, that the choice of
the election system can significantly influence the result of the elections. Multicandidate
elections allow many paradoxes, so e. g. the election outcome may more accurately reflect
the voting method rather than the voters’ desires (e. g. Saari [12], Nurmi [11]). We will
investigate two groups of classic voting systems with preferential ordering of candidates
or alternatives; it means a group of scoring voting systems ( such as e. g. Borda count)
and Alternative Vote system (AV). Modifications of scoring voting systems with new
weights will be compared with Borda count and Alternative Vote with the classic first
past the post system (FPTP), where the candidate with most first preferences is the
winner of the election.
Any positional voting system with clear ranking designation of preferences can be
seen as a weighted (or sometimes – distance) based voting system. The first well-known
method that works with this approach is Borda rule [1]. The proposal of J. C. Borda
was to rank preferences, mark them according to the ordinal positions provided and
finally add up these marks. In this case, we can speak about equidistance between two
succesive alternatives in a preferential sequence. His work was extended in a statistical
framework by Kendall [10] and by the proposal of Nanson (see e. g. Fishburn [8]).
There are other measures taken by studying ordinal preference aggregation problems
based on the distances between preferences in individual rankings. Kemeny [9] proposed
distance measures in comparison of pairs of alternatives where the relative position of
individual preferences is different to the group ordinal preferences. It should help to
solve the problem with cycles in majority voting systems. In Cook & Seiford [5, 6]
approach l1 and l2 metrics were used to find the most representative alternative. A new
approach to the weighted (or distance) based method was used also in Saari & Merlin
[13], Eckert et al. [7] and Contreras [4]. Several interesting approaches can also be found
in Vavŕıková [14].
In the second section of the paper there is a short description of the mentioned and
considered voting systems, in the third part the proposed method. The section after
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that is dedicated to the examples and the last one to the conclusion of the paper.
2. SHORT DESCRIPTION OF VOTING SYSTEMS
In our paper, we use as comparison or inspiration some of the less or more known voting
systems. After the short introduction above, we would like to describe some of the voting
systems in this short paragraph. All are based on preferences for respective candidates
or alternatives and they are all single-winner methods.
Borda count as one of the scoring voting systems was introduced by J. C.Borda in
1770 in France. It is used in many professional organizations to select some alternatives,
also to elect minority candidates for parliament in Slovenia and in modified version in
parliamentary elections in Nauru. The basic idea behind this method is to award each
ranking (preference) with a certain amount of points. In the case of n candidates the first
preference becomes n points, second n− 1 and so on, the last nth preference is awarded
by 1 point. The winner is the candidate with highest cumulative number of points
after summation of the results from all voters. It promotes a consensual result, as the
winner with the most first preferences does not have to be the winner. There are many
modified versions of Borda count such as e. g. Nanson method or Baldwin method .
Both of them use ranked ballots as Borda count does. But after each aggregation the
candidates with the fewest points are eliminated (Baldwin), or all candidates with less
points than the average are eliminated (Nanson). The next round is recalculated with
only the remaining candidates. The procedure lasts until a single winner remains.
Plurality vote elects as the winner the candidate with the most (not necessarily a
majority) of first preferences. It is widely used in elections all around the world e. g.
India, Canada, United Kingdom. We can also understand it as a scoring voting system
since the first preference receives one point and the other preferences zero. It is also
often called First Past The Post (FPTP).
Antiplurality vote is the system where voters vote against their least favorite option
among the candidates. It can also be understood as the scoring voting system, where
the voted option gets 0 points and all the others 1 point. The candidate with the best
result – most points in total, is the winner. As we can see all three previously described
methods could be taken as scoring voting methods.
Approval voting is an election system, in which each candidate is either approved
by the voter, which means he/she receives one point or disapproved, then the candidate
receives zero points. The candidate with the most votes in total is the winner. It is used
in many professional organizations such as e. g. Mathematical Association of America
or American Statistical Association.
Condorcet method is not a scoring voting system, but it is also based on rank-
ing candidates on the ballot according to the voter’s preferences. It was introduced by
French mathematician Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, the Marquis de Condorcet.
The scheme was a strong competitor to the Borda scheme in France in the 18th cen-
tury and we can say that competition continues till this day. The Condorcet winner is
the candidate who beats any other candidate in pairwise comparisons. These pairwise
comparisons between all the candidates are based on the preferential ordering by voters.
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Alternative Vote (AV) is also called Instant-Runoff Voting or Preferential Voting
or Ranking Choice Voting. It is also from time to time called Ware’s method or Hare-
Clark method after the inventors of this type of voting scheme. It is used to elect the
Presidents of Ireland and India, members of the Australian House of Representatives, etc.
Voters put the candidates into a preferential sequence and counting is ongoing mostly
in more than one round until any candidate secures the majority of first preferences,
then the winner is found. If nobody has the majority of first preferences, then the last
candidate in the respective round is eliminated and its second preference becomes the
new first one (positions in the sequence are shifting one up), and all the counting is
repeated.
Scoring voting systems assign a special value to each position in a preferential se-
quence. Aggregation of these values forms the result. Standard Alternative Vote is in
the beginning close to the procedure of FPTP, first preferences are counted and the
alternative with more than 50 % of votes is the winner; if there is no such alternative,
the one with the fewest first preferences is eliminated and its second best is “upgraded”
and redistributed with the same value to the remaining first preferences. Again, if one
of the alternatives then has more than 50 %, it is the winner; if not the whole procedure
is repeated until there is a clear winner with over 50 % of the votes. One of the main
differences is that in scoring voting systems, different positions reflect different values
in aggregation; Alternative Vote uses the same value when the preferences are counted.
This can change with the introduction of weights based on poistions (or distances).
Other differences are e. g. that scoring voting systems satisfy criteria of consistency and
monotonicity and do not always comply with majority criterion; AV does exactly the
opposite (majority criterion only in specific “loose” way). Both methods do not elect a
Condorcet winner in all the cases, but they meet the Condorcet loser criterion.
Short description of the above mentioned criteria:
• Consistency: If A is the choice of voter group V and B is the choice of group V ′
disjoint from V and if A ∩ B 6= 0, then merged groups V ∪ V ′ should choose the
winner in A ∩B (as in Young [15]); or in other words the choice which win in the
two separated groups should also win overall.
• Monotonicity: Ranking an alternative higher should not have negative impact on
its overall result.
• Majority: The candidate which receives more than half of the votes is the overall
winner.
• Condorcet winner: The candidate who wins against any other candidates in pair-
wise comparison should always be the overall winner.
• Condorcet loser: The candidate, which loses to any other candidate in pairwise
comparison should always be the loser.
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3. THE PROPOSED METHOD
3.1. Scoring voting systems
First, we will define the meaning of weights in our way of understanding and computing.
Let A = {a1, a2, . . . , an} be a set of n alternatives, which can be ordered in a sequence
of alternatives by each voter. We assume that each voter will produce a sincere order-
ing of preferences independently of any possibility of strategic or tactical behavior. For
simplicity in this paper, we will use a sequence ordering which guarantees a linear order
of alternatives; it means no ties will be taken into account. Lets introduce a discrete
function k : A → {1, 2, . . . , n}, which describes the position of the alternative in the
sequence. Lets have a non-decreasing function F (x) as weight value function, where x
represents the preferential positions from 1 to n. If al is preferred to ai (al  ai) we
can write that ∃F : {1, 2, . . . , n} → R, ∀ai, al ∈ A, al  ai ⇔ F (k(al)) < F (k(ai)).
Weight value function F (x) is a function of position k(a) of the alternative a in the
sequence, i. e., it can be understood as a utility function representing the preferences
of the discussed voter. E.g. we have a set of alternatives {a1, a2, a3, a4} = {A,B, C, D}
and the sequence of preferences ADCB, k(A) = 1 and k(B) = 4. Next, we will discuss
the utilization of weight value function in scoring voting systems; for Alternative Vote
we will use a slightly different approach.
One of the easiest possible ways of introducing a weight value function is the linear
function F (x) = x−1, which is actually a slightly modified approach of Borda count. In
this case the sequence of weights according to the position would obviously be: F (1) = 0,
F (2) = 1, F (3) = 2, F (4) = 3, for n = 4. Nevertheless, the definition of the function is
completely dependent on the designer of the voting system. With careful shaping of this
function, we can suppress some negative aspects of the method used, or also sharpen
other desired aspects. Let us elaborate on these three examples and see also Figure 1,
where (n = 4):
a) If we would like to emphasize the role of the winning (first one in the sequence)
alternative, the impact will decrease with higher position, so the weight difference
between the 2 last alternatives in the sequence should be the smallest one. In
this case we can use the square root function e. g.: F (x) =
√
x− 1. It shifts the
voting method towards the plurality voting method. The sequence of weights is:
F (1) = 0, F (2) = 1, F (3) = 1.41, F (4) = 1.73, for n = 4.
b) If we want to suppress the impact of the least preferred alternative in the preferen-
tial sequence of an individual voter – an approach which is closer to antiplurality
vote, we can use e. g.: F (x) = (x − 1)2. The sequence of weights in this case is:
F (1) = 0, F (2) = 1, F (3) = 4, F (4) = 9, for n = 4.
c) If we would like to emphasize the impact of extremes, enforce the winning al-
ternative and “punish” the last one, some kind of concave function suggests it-
self like e. g. simple quadratic function. We introduce s as the middle posi-
tion of our sequence of alternatives, s = (n − 1)/2 and helping function h(x) =
(x − 1 − s)2 · sign(x − 1 − s). The weight value function in this case will be:
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Fig. 1. Description of the weight values for scoring voting method.
F (x) = h(x)−h(1). We will call it a symmetric function. The sequence of weights
is: F (1) = 0, F (2) = 2, F (3) = 2.5, F (4) = 4.5, for n = 4.
If we have a finite set of voters or decision makers B = {b1, b2, . . . , bm}, we can
introduce F (kj(ai)) as a weight value function for the jth voter and ith alternative;
j = 1, 2, . . . ,m and i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Finally we can introduce alternative value function





The winning alternative is a = arg min {V (ai), i = 1, 2, . . . , n}. We should note that
there are other ways of minimizing the value function V . In the case when the winning
alternative is not a singleton, we can use different additional tie-breaking procedures. So
the decisive rule could be e. g. the most 1st preferences, then the most 2nd preferences,
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and so on or other invented measures could be used. One additional approach to solve
this problem can also be found in the next paragraph.





(F (kj(ai)) + 1),
or median,
V (ai) = med(F (k1(ai)), . . . , F (km(ai))).
The relation between sum and product can be seen as the relation between arithmetic
and geometric mean. Alternative aggregation methods could be used also as a tie-
breaking rule if another rule does not bring a clear winner.
3.2. Alternative Vote
Motivation to adopt a weight based system into Alternative Vote comes from discussions
between supporters of AV and FPTP before the referendum about possible change to the
voting system in the UK in May 2011. In the end after the referendum FPTP remained.
There are doubts whether and how correct it is to count upgraded second, third or even
fourth preference of some alternatives in respective rounds of voting, with the same value
as first preferences of other alternatives. The introduction of weights to the system can
solve this problem and at the same time maintain the main characteristics of AV, the
possibility to vote freely for marginal candidates or alternatives without the risk of in
reality wasting the vote completely.
We will slightly modify the weight value function F (x), which will be non-increasing
in general in this case with default value 1 for first preference i. e. F (1) = 1. It allows
us to preserve aggregation in the same way as standard Alternative Vote without any
difference. In fact the weight value function for standard AV is F (x) = 1, for all the
possible preferential positions. The weight value actually means in this case the vote
value aggregated in subsequent rounds of counting (so it is also described in Figure 2,
where used functions are depicted).
One typical weight value function for alternative vote can be F (x) = 1 − x−1x . We
will call it the hyperbolic function, because it is the same situation as we would get from
allocating weight 1/p for each pth preference in the sequence, where p ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
This function enforces the better-positioned candidates. The sequence of weight (or
vote) values in this case is: F (1) = 1, F (2) = 1/2, F (3) = 1/3, F (4) = 1/4, for n = 4.
As we already pointed out in the previous section, we can influence the outcome of an
election by designing this function and we show some examples:
a) Concave quadratic function F (x) =
√
(n− x + 1)/n strengthens the importance
of higher preferences, decrease of the value of each position is slower, at least for
the higher ranks, it is closer to the standard AV than the next two functions.
The sequence of weight (or vote) values in this case is: F (1) = 1, F (2) = 0.87,
F (3) = 0.71, F (4) = 0.5, for n = 4.
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Fig. 2. Description of the vote (weight) values for Alternative Vote
method.
b) Linear function F (x) = 1 − (x − 1)/n secures an equivalent drop in the value of
position. The sequence of weight (or vote) values is: F (1) = 1, F (2) = 0.75,
F (3) = 0.5, F (4) = 0.25, for n = 4.
c) Convex quadratic function F (x) = 1 −
√
(x− 1)/n strengthens the importance
solely of the first preference, because the drop in value of other ranks is more
significant. As a result, it is closer to FPTP than the previous two examples. It is
very close to previously described hyperbolic function, but the decrease of values
in lower positions is even more significant. The sequence of weight (or vote) values
in this case is: F (1) = 1, F (2) = 0.5, F (3) = 0.29, F (4) = 0.13, for n = 4.
We can construct many other similar functions, which are non-increasing and F (1) = 1.
We can also designate the minimal value v for last nth rank as F (n) = v.
The aggregation is a bit more complicated. In specific consequent rounds for each
alternative or candidate, we will aggregate the results only if the respective alternative
is available for counting (it is the first preference originally or by “upgrade” after redis-
tribution of votes from previous round). It means, for the jth voter and ith alternative;





F (kj(ai)) | only for actually 1st placed ai
}
. (2)
The procedure is finished and the winning alternative ai is found if in the respective
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There is a need to mention, that the condition for the winning alternative to secure more
than 50% of original votes is valid only for the first round of counting, the total amount
of votes for each next round will decrease, because some of the aggregated values of
votes will be less than 1.
4. EXAMPLES
4.1. Scoring voting system
According to Table 1 we can investigate the situation in the classic voting system with
72 voters and 3 different voting schemes chosen by voters. This example and the next
one can also be found in Bystrický [3].





F (x) V (A) V (B) V (C)
x− 1 71 74 71√
x− 1 57.5 59.4 56.9
(x− 1)2 117 124 119
Tab. 2.
F (x) V (A) V (B) V (C)
x− 1 3.16 14.22 2.37 E + 18√
x− 1 5.16 6.22 1.29 E + 16
(x− 1)2 4 50 5 E + 23
Tab. 3.
Results based on the application of three weight value functions are summarized in
Table 2, which shows the different outcomes (winner is always in bold) for each function
according to the anticipation. There is no clear winner in the case of the linear function;
the winner for the other two functions is according to the designer’s wish. Equation 1
was used for aggregation.
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Just for comparison, we can compute the same case with another aggregation method
– product, as it is proposed above. The results are shown in Table 3. They are very
similar to Table 2, only there is no tie in the case of linear identity function. Accordingly
this approach can be used e. g. as a tie-breaking rule in the case of the value function
calculated as a sum.
Another example is investigating the situation with one hundred voters, which dis-
tribute their votes in four possible profiles according to the Table 4.






F (x) V (A) V (B) V (C) V (D)
x− 1 125 121 163 193√
x− 1 83.25 92.02 114.84 124.52
(x− 1)2 311 245 347 497
sym 188.5 194 233.5 284
Tab. 5. SUM.
F (x) V (A) V (B) V (C) V (D)
x− 1 8.47 E+27 6.10 E+29 1.26 E+38 1.16 E+42√
x− 1 1.61 E+22 4.99 E+25 2.11 E+31 6.31 E+32
(x− 1)2 4.00 E+41 3.36 E+39 1.53 E+54 4.88 E+64
sym 3.32 E+35 2.48 E+40 6.95 E+47 2.50 E+52
Tab. 6. PRODUCT.
The results for the situation described above can be found in Tables 5 and 6. The
outcomes are very similar for both aggregation operators, with only one difference for
square root function where alternative B is the winner in the case of value function
calculated as a product. Otherwise, the results are as expected according to the chosen
value added functions.
4.2. Alternative Vote
As the first example in the Section of examples for Alternative Vote, we will analyze the
same scheme as described in Table 4. In Tables 7 – 10 we show four different results for
standard alternative vote, followed by versions with introduced weight value functions
(see Section 3.2) – convex quadratic, linear and concave quadratic. The outcome for
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hyperbolic function is homothetic with the result for convex quadratic function with the
same winner. As we can see, we obtained similar results with the same winner D in
the case of standard AV as well as AV with concave quadratic weight value function.
AV with linear function shows very tight competition with a different winner, A for
this scheme and finally AV with convex quadratic function again brings clear winner A,
which is all in line with the choice and design of the weight value functions. In standard
AV, even if the winner D secures only 17 first preferences (in comparison to 42 first
preferences for A – winner in FPTP); it is a clear victory in the third and final round.
Application of a weight based function can influence these outcomes according to the
value assigned for each position and change the results.
Round V (A) V (B) V (C) V (D)
1 42 26 15 17
2 42 26 32
3 42 58
Tab. 7. Standard AV
Round V (A) V (B) V (C) V (D)
1 42 26 15 17
2 42 26 24.5
3 54.9 26
Tab. 8. Convex AV
Round V (A) V (B) V (C) V (D)
1 42 26 15 17
2 42 26 28.25
3 42 41.25
Tab. 9. Linear AV
Round V (A) V (B) V (C) V (D)
1 42 26 15 17
2 42 26 30
3 42 48.4
Tab. 10. Concave AV
We can describe how we obtained the results e. g. in Table 8 for convex function. The
first row is simple as we calculated only the first preferences for respective candidates.
After the 1st round C is eliminated and second preference D becomes the first one and
it is added to V (D). Then V (D) = 17 ∗ F (1) + 15 ∗ F (2) = 17 + 7.5 = 24.5, which is
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the smallest value in the 2nd round of calculation and D is eliminated. All the votes
from D are redistributed accordingly to A and after 3 rounds A becomes the winner,
as V (A) = 42 ∗ F (1) + 17 ∗ F (2) + 15 ∗ F (3) = 42 ∗ 1 + 17 ∗ 0.5 + 15 ∗ 0.29 = 54.85,
where F (1), F (2) and F (3) are naturally taken from the weight sequence for the convex
function, 15 from scheme 4 from Table 4 and 17 from the scheme 3 from the same Table.
All the other calculations are made in a similar way.






The second example works with a slightly modified scheme as shown in Table 11. The
leading preferences, first B and second A are clearly ahead of the two other alternatives.
Counting in the first two rounds leads to the transfer of second and third ranks for
alternative A adding to the 30 votes originally allocated as first preference. Therefore,
A finally wins after three rounds with 52 total votes compared to 48 votes for alternative
B, which could not secure any other votes from second and/or third places thanks to
the distribution of preferences (see Table 12).
Round V (A) V (B) V (C) V (D)
1 30 48 10 12
2 30 48 22
3 52 48
Tab. 12. Standard AV.
Round V (A) V (B) V (C) V (D)
1 30 48 10 12
2 30 48 17
3 38.9 48
Tab. 13. Convex AV.
Round V (A) V (B) V (C) V (D)
1 30 48 10 12
2 30 48 19.5
3 43 48
Tab. 14. Linear AV.
548 R. BYSTRICKÝ
Round V (A) V (B) V (C) V (D)
1 30 48 10 12
2 30 48 20.7
3 47.5 48
Tab. 15. Concave AV.
Also in other results for AV with introduced weight based function (see Tables 13 –
15), we can see that the initial advantage for alternative B (48 preferences) was good
enough to stay as winner under all circumstances. We can see also that, as expected, the
introduction of concave quadratic function brings the best result regarding alternative
A for competing with alternative B, as this is the closest function by nature to standard
AV. In addition, the other results contain anticipated characteristics according to the
attributes of the selected functions. Imagine that if we would distribute the 22 trans-
ferred votes to alternative A otherwise, alternative A could still be the winner with the
introduction of the concave quadratic function, despite the huge advantage of 48 votes
for alternative B. The desired distribution would be at least 16 votes (instead of 12)
for sub-profile DABC, and the remaining 6 remain for sub-profile CDAB. This result
would also be similar if we would use the hyperbolic function, but we cannot secure the
win with the transfer of 22 votes as above just by applying any other of the proposed
functions. Simply the advantage of 18 votes is too big and the result will tend to the
result of FPTP.
5. CONCLUSION
The change of method certainly brings new possible paradoxes and shortages in other
cases, as it is impossible to construct a general always-functioning model how to deal
with voting and achieve “justified” outcomes. In our recalculations, the winner is e. g.
not always Condorcet winner, but the outputs are promising.
In the scoring voting schemes it allows us to design a voting system according to
the wishes of the designers, and the scheme is always monotonic. Different aggregation
operators can produce different results in particular cases, it is necessary to be aware of
it and use it according to expectations, e. g. also as tie-breaking rule.
The introduction of weights into Alternative Vote system allows us to secure re-
suls similar to typical plurality voting systems, like FPTP, if this is desired. With
the appropriate choice of weight based function AV can be calibrated as “continuous”
transformation from standard AV to FPTP system or stay in between, according to the
wishes. Of course it can bring some additional problems, but this approach contains the
demanded characteristics from both systems.
Weight based functions can be designed in many other ways, they should only keep the
basic characteristics. It is necessary to study this approach more precisely in order to find
shortcomings. In addition, it is necessary to investigate the mathematical characteristics
of this approach more broadly. The way which method and approach is used should
depend on our expectation from the voting. Stakeholders should be able to determine
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the expected characteristics of voting systems together with identifying which negative
outcomes should be excluded. With appropriate weight based function it could be
possible to address at least some of their wishes. However, the whole approach should
be studied further, especially focusing on generalizing formulas replacing the classic sum
or product with other aggregation functions.
Further research should also include the analysis of properties also according to
changes in used weight based functions in order to have better knowledge about the
whole system. It will allow more possibilities and options for designers of voting sys-
tems.
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